Artículos

Migration Processes Caused by the Russian-Ukrainian War: Worldview and Sociological Context

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Procesos migratorios provocados por la guerra ruso-ucraniana: contexto mundial-óptico-sociológico

Anatolii Getman

Yaroslav Mudryi National Law University, Ukraine

rector@nlu.edu.ua

 https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1987-2760

Oleg Danilyan

Yaroslav Mudryi National Law University, Ukraine

odana@i.ua

https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5308-4664

Oleksandr Dzeban

Yaroslav Mudryi National Law University, Ukraine

a_dzeban@ukr.net

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2075-7508

Yurii Kalynovskyi

Yaroslav Mudryi National Law University, Ukraine

kalina_uu@ukr.net

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0081-8107

Galina Klimova

Yaroslav Mudryi National Law University, Ukraine

klimova55@gmail.com

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6533-199Х

Recibido el 20 de marzo del 2025     Aceptado el 7 de mayo del 2025

Páginas 339-360

https://doi.org/10.58210/nhyg700

Financiamiento: Se financió con recursos propios.

Conflictos de interés: Los autores declaran no presentar conflicto de interés.

Licencia Creative Commons Atributtion Nom-Comercial 4.0 Unported (CC BY-NC 4.0) Licencia Internacional

Abstract

The article analyzes the main trends and characteristics of migration processes formed in Ukraine as a result of a large-scale Russian aggression which began on February 24, 2022. It is emphasized that the migration processes in Ukraine are in constant dynamics, affecting the pan-European migration picture. The methodological basis of this study is the theory of culture shock, cultural distance and adaptation psychology, scientific works on conflictology, studies of social exclusion and discrimination, concepts of ethno-cultural boundaries and social distance, political science research on risk factors and the functioning of diasporas. The article notes that the formation of migration sentiments in Ukrainian society was influenced by the growing social instability, starting with the Orange Revolution of 2004 and ending with the military actions in the territory of Ukraine in 2014-2024. Since 2014, a new social group has emerged in Ukraine – internally displaced persons (IDPs). The large-scale hostilities in Ukraine (since February 24, 2022) have led to a significant increase in the number of internally displaced persons and immigrants outside the country. The migration processes that have intensified in Ukraine as a consequence of the Russian aggression have had a significant impact on the socio-economic, political, legal, spiritual and cultural spheres both in Ukraine and in Europe as a whole. Overcoming the negative migration trends caused by the Russian-Ukrainian war requires of the state elaboration of a comprehensive, scientifically based strategy which will differ significantly, if the war continues, and after its end.

Keywords: migration, Russian-Ukrainian war, internally displaced persons, international migration.

Resumen

El artículo analiza las principales tendencias y características de los procesos migratorios en Ucrania, que se formaron bajo la influencia de la agresión rusa, que comenzó el 24 de febrero de 2022. Se observa que los procesos migratorios en el territorio de Ucrania están en constante dinámica, lo que afecta el panorama general de la migración europea. La base metodológica de este estudio es la teoría del choque cultural, la distancia cultural y la psicología de la adaptación, trabajos científicos sobre estudios de conflictos, investigaciones sobre exclusión y discriminación social, conceptos de fronteras etnoculturales y distancia social, estudios de ciencias políticas sobre factores de riesgo y el funcionamiento de las diásporas. El artículo señala que la formación de sentimientos migratorios en la sociedad ucraniana estuvo influenciada por la creciente inestabilidad social, que comenzó con la "Revolución Naranja" en 2004 y finalizó con las acciones militares en el territorio de Ucrania en 2014-2024. Desde 2014, se ha formado en Ucrania un nuevo grupo social de la población: los desplazados internos (PDI). Las hostilidades a gran escala en Ucrania (desde el 24 de febrero de 2022) han provocado un aumento significativo del número de desplazados internos e inmigrantes fuera del país. Los procesos migratorios intensificados en Ucrania como resultado de la agresión rusa tienen un impacto significativo en las esferas socioeconómica, político-legal, espiritual y cultural tanto en la propia Ucrania como en los países europeos. Superar las tendencias migratorias negativas causadas por la guerra ruso-ucraniana requiere una estrategia compleja y basada en la ciencia por parte del Estado, que será significativamente diferente si la guerra continúa y después de que termine.

Palabras clave: migración, guerra ruso-ucraniana, desplazados internos, migración internacional.

Introduction

The full-scale Russian-Ukrainian war, which began on February 24, 2022, has become a hard trial for the Ukrainian people, having radically changed the established economic, political, legal, spiritual, cultural and other aspects of their life. This tragedy has served as a catalyst for a number of negative processes, one of which is the formation of powerful migration flows both within Ukraine – internally displaced persons (IDPs) – and a significant increase in external migration – the departure of Ukrainian citizens abroad in search of safe and stable living conditions. It should be pointed out that the above-mentioned trends began to take shape in Ukraine in 2014, when the Russian Federation invaded the territory of the Ukrainian state, resulting in the partial occupation of Donetsk and Luhansk regions and the Crimea.

For a correct study of the stated problem issues, it is worth noting that the classical forms of migration are immigration, emigration, and re-emigration. In the scientific and reference literature, emigration is interpreted as a forced or voluntary resettlement of indigenous people from their homeland to another country for permanent or temporary residence for political, social, economic, religious and other reasons^[1]. In turn, immigration is the entry (settlement) of citizens of one state into another for permanent or temporary (usually long-term) residence. In addition, there is also the concept of re-emigration, which means the return of former or current citizens of a state to their homeland or return migration to their countries of origin^[2].

For a comprehensive understanding of migration processes and their consequences, we will rely on the outcomes of a number of studies from different fields of knowledge: the theory of culture shock; cultural distance and adaptation psychology (A. Fournham and A. Bochner, J. Berry); scientific works on conflictology (J. Galtung); studies of social exclusion and discrimination (G. Hans); ethnocultural borders (F. Barth); social distance (G. Simmel, R. Park, A. Burgess); political science studies of risk factors (T. Gurr) and diasporas (W. Safran, G. Scheffer, K. Tololian) and others^[3].

Among Ukrainian scholars, the interdisciplinary scientific research works of  Y. Kondratiev, Y. Rymarenko, V. Olefir, T. Panchenko^[4], S. Sardak^[5], K. Shymanska^[6], S. Semiv^[7], E. Libanova^[8], M. Bil^[9], I. Kovalenko, Y. Meliakova, E. Kalnytskyi, K. Nesterenko, S. Zhdanenko^[10], related to migration studies as a research area, migration law, interrelated problems of migration, ethnopolitics, ethnic conflicts, nationalism, human rights and various minorities, the development of democracy in transitional societies, as well as the specifics of traumatic experience in the context of modern biopolitics and the development of media technologies, deserve a special attention.

Analyzing the unfolding of migration processes in modern Ukraine, Ukrainian scholars S. Horban, O. Bilenko, and T. Trubnik identify the following four main stages:

1. The early post-independence period (1991-2004). This stage was characterized by significant internal migration, primarily from rural to urban areas, as well as by a large number of Ukrainians moving abroad, mainly to Russia and other CIS countries. During this period, there was a high level of labor migration, when a large number of Ukrainian workers sought employment opportunities in the neighboring countries.

2. The integration period (2004-2013). During this period, internal migration continued in Ukraine, particularly from rural to urban areas. However, the country saw also an increase in external migration, especially to Western Europe, as a result of Ukraine’s intensified cooperation with the European Union. This period was characterized by an increase in labor migration, with many Ukrainians seeking employment in Poland, Italy, Spain, and other EU countries. In addition, Ukraine became a transit country for migrants from Asia and Africa trying to reach Western Europe.

3. The occupation period (2014-2021). Military operations in Eastern Ukraine have significantly affected migration patterns within the country. The hostilities resulted in a large number of internally displaced persons (IDPs), and many Ukrainians fled the war zones in Donetsk and Luhansk regions. Emigration also increased during this period: Ukrainians sought refuge in the neighboring countries, primarily in Poland and other EU countries. The signing of the visa-free regime agreement between Ukraine and the EU in Strasbourg on May 17, 2017, expanded migration opportunities for Ukrainians.

4. The war period (February 24, 2022 – present). The Russian-Ukrainian war that began on February 24, 2022, had a profound impact on migration processes in Ukraine. Large-scale hostilities and widespread destruction have led to massive displacement, with millions of Ukrainians fleeing their homes in search of safety within or outside the country. During this period, the number of refugees and asylum seekers increased significantly, with Ukrainians seeking protection in the neighboring countries, including Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, Romania, Moldova and other EU member states, as well as Canada and the United States^[11].

In the context of war, migration processes in Ukraine are in constant dynamics, affecting the European migration picture. If the hostilities continue and the living conditions of citizens deteriorate, this will lead to new flows of migrants outside Ukraine. Respectively, once the fighting stops, the re-emigration process will begin.

1. CAUSES OF MIGRATION PROCESSES IN THE 21st CENTURY: UKRAINIAN AND INTERNATIONAL CONTEXTS

Starting with the events on Maidan in 2004 (the “Orange Revolution”), Ukraine entered a period of intense social turbulence, which also determined migration processes. Subsequently, social instability as a factor of migration was exacerbated by the economic crisis of 2008, social protests in 2013-2014 (the Revolution of Dignity), military actions in the territory of Ukraine since 2014, and Russia’s large-scale aggression against Ukraine in 2022.

In order to understand migration attitudes and trends in Ukraine, we believe that it is necessary to take into account the historical^[12], mental and ethno-cultural peculiarities of the Ukrainian people’s development ^[13], the value aspects of the existence of social systems in unstable conditions^[14], and some other factors.

The global crisis of international relations, which has determined the reformatting of the world order in the political, economic, and military dimensions, has contributed to the intensification of migration processes in the world and Ukraine in particular. According to O. Vysotsky, the world is in a state of the so-called metacrisis, which has shifted the established forms of existence and led to increased migration for various reasons. Vysotsky emphasizes that the metacrisis is a critical, all-encompassing threat to the basic values of truth, beauty, and goodness. It stemms from widespread misconceptions, misjudgments, and abuses of reality. This fundamental problem intersects with and exacerbates global crises, characterized by a collective delusion rooted in both the spiritual and material exhaustion of the modern era. The crisis manifests itself through various institutional and cultural forms, negatively affecting life on Earth^[15].  

Continuing with the above logic, scholars state that the reasons for the growth of international migration movements, as well as changes in their essential characteristics, are the result of globalization processes. Removal of obstacles to free trade, growth of political, economic, social interdependence between states, which is manifested in the formation of transnational business and the international labor market, internationalization of science, education, information, and unprecedented development of communications, were crucial for the dynamics and volume of migration^[16].

Identifying the negative and positive aspects of migration processes, scholars A. Geddes, E. Guild, J. van Selm focus on the ambivalent nature of migration: on the one hand, it carries an additional burden on all subsystems of society, while strengthening the human potential of the country, on the other hand. In particular, they note that the dangers of migration are recorded primarily in host societies, which is paradoxical, since immigrants replenish their human and intellectual resources, i.e. the main factors of production, thereby enhancing their economic security.  Despite this, the local population sometimes has a negative attitude towards migration because of its cost, i.e., an additional burden on the social welfare system as well as on the education, transportation, and housing systems. However, in the end, migrants “work off” this help and generate additional income for the host country^[17].

Noteworthy, Ukrainians who emigrated abroad due to the war are overwhelmingly citizens with higher education (mostly women) who have become or will become a significant socioeconomic resource for the countries in which they find themselves.  

According to sociologists, the vast majority of Ukrainian refugees are women with children whose husbands remained in Ukraine. The very first sociological surveys showed that the majority of refugees from Ukraine are people of working age who were employed in Ukraine. Moreover, the vast majority of them had full-time jobs in their country, and a fifth were self-employed or entrepreneurs^[18]. However, over time, there have been certain changes in the socio-demographic structure of Ukrainian refugees: the share of young, unmarried or divorced women, and childless women, who are representatives of the eastern and southern regions of the country, and socially vulnerable categories of the population, some of whom may have suffered significant losses as a result of the war, has increased^[19].

In general, the factors of migration processes are multifaceted. According to O. Pylypchenko, they can be classified as follows:

1. Depending on the ability to regulate the impact of factors on the migration process:

– controllable;

– uncontrollable;

– mixed, which can be regulated by indirect influence.

2. Depending on the time of action of the factors:

– permanently acting factors;

– slowly changing factors;

– variable factors.

3. Depending on the nature of the factors and their relation to the mechanism of determining migration flows:

– conditioning factors;

– structural factors.

4. Depending on the degree of involvement of an individual in the migration process:

– subjective factors;

– objective factors (divided into natural and social factors).

5. Depending on the perception of migration by the individual:

– positive factors;

– negative factors.

6. Depending on the motivating influence on the individual:

– attracting factors;

– repelling factors.

7. Depending on the level of influence on migration processes:

– macro-level factors;

– meso-level factors;

– micro-level factors ^[20].

For present-day Ukraine, almost all of the above factors are relevant, which will be analyzed in the following paragraphs.

2. INTERNAL MIGRATION IN UKRAINE IN THE CONTEXT OF THE RUSSIAN-UKRAINIAN WAR

Since 2014 (the beginning of the Russian aggression), a new social group has been formed in Ukraine – internally displaced persons (IDPs). The large-scale hostilities in Ukraine (February 24, 2022) led to a significant increase in the number of internally displaced persons.

Internally displaced persons are individuals or groups of individuals who are citizens of a particular country or citizens of other states, legally residing in the country, who are forced to leave their places of permanent residence as a result of the complication of the political, socio-economic, environmental situation in a particular administrative-territorial unit of the state in order to avoid violence, human rights violations, the effects of natural or man-made disasters, environmental changes, socio-economic development projects to preserve life and freedom, and have not crossed internationally recognized state borders. Internally displaced persons are a socio-geographical category, as forced migration that causes the emergence of IDPs is part of a socio-geographical process, the essence of which is to change the place of residence of a person or group of persons. In the process of displacement, the borders of different administrative-territorial units are crossed, resulting in a temporary or permanent change of place of residence and employment, which is one of the types of social mobility (manifested in a change of social status, occupation, etc.)^[21].

According to Ukrainian law, internally displaced persons are:

• citizens of Ukraine, foreigners or stateless persons who are legally present in the territory of Ukraine and have the right to permanent residence in Ukraine;
• citizens of Ukraine who were forced to leave or abandon their place of residence as a result of or in order to avoid the negative consequences of the armed conflict, temporary occupation, widespread violence, human rights violations, and natural or man-made emergencies (part 1 of Article 1 of the Law of Ukraine “On Ensuring the Rights and Freedoms of Internally Displaced Persons” of October 20, 2014)^[22].

Thus, two waves of IDPs can be distinguished: the first wave starting in 2014, and the second wave starting on February 24, 2022. The main features of the first wave are as follows:

– internal migrant flows had different political preferences and levels of cohesion depending on where they were forced to migrate from and at what stage;

– forced migration was significant, although the exact scale of this displacement is unknown. At the initial stage of the external aggression, approximately 2 million people were forced to leave their places of permanent residence. Subsequently, before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation, the number of officially registered IDPs averaged 1.5 million. These figures do not accurately reflect the full extent of internal migration, as some IDPs refused to register officially;

– In 2014, there was no centralized evacuation of the population, organized by the state, from the combat zones. This determined the nature of IDP resettlement. They mostly chose a new place of residence on their own, based on previous experience and contacts. These could be family ties or professional contacts, employment opportunities or more affordable housing prices;

– This wave of forced displacement was primarily “urban” – people mostly moved to large cities. As a result, a large group of IDPs almost immediately became invisible, dissolving in the urban space;

– A fairly large number of citizens registered as IDPs in the government-controlled areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions were of retirement age. A significant number of them lived in the occupied territories, and occasionally entered the government-controlled areas to undergo identification procedures and receive pensions^[23].

Accordingly, the second wave of IDPs caused by Russia’s full-scale invasion was much more numerous. Thus, as of December 12, 2022, according to the Ministry of Social Policy, 4,893,079 people were registered as internally displaced in Ukraine, of whom 1,093,821 were children^[24].

The majority of IDPs relocated individually or with the help of authorized state authorities from Eastern and Central Ukraine to Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Chernivtsi, Zakarpattia, Volyn, Rivne, Ternopil, Khmelnytsky, and Vinnytsia regions. At the same time, Kyiv, from which almost half of its residents left at the beginning of the war, became a place of relocation for refugees, usually from the Left-bank Ukraine^[25].

To this day, the cities of Central Ukraine remain important reception points for refugees from the southeastern regions of the country. According to the UN map, there are more than 2.9 million internally displaced persons in Western Ukraine; 1.4 million in the central regions on the right bank of the Dnipro River; 1.3 million northeast of Kyiv; 357,000 south of Kyiv and north of Odesa and Mykolaiv; and 857,000 on the left bank of the Dnipro River (in Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions). A considerable proportion of internally displaced persons are children, of whom: 38% are children aged 5-17; 14% are children aged 1-5; 4% are infants^[26].

Today, IDPs can be divided into several groups that require differentiated policies from the state:

•  persons who arrived with a certain amount of money, kept their previous place of work, for example, working remotely or on a shift basis, living with relatives or friends – a significant number of them are already returning home or waiting to return and are not going to integrate in the life of the communities of their temporary residence;
•  women with work experience abroad and relevant connections, who aim to stay abroad to take advantage of favorable conditions for obtaining legal and fairly liberal status in developed countries; most of them will not return and, after restrictions on men of military age are lifted, their husbands are likely to join them;
•  IDPs from large cities with developed labor markets and infrastructure, who have higher education and are accustomed to fairly high standards of living – the share of those who would agree to permanent residence in small settlements, to employment in agriculture, construction and even industry seems to be very small: mostly families whose homes were destroyed;
•  people who have lost their homes or are so afraid of being in the area of active hostilities that they do not want to return – for them, the issue of employment in the western regions of Ukraine is directly related to the possibility of obtaining permanent housing or guarantees of this, and their requirements for both housing and work are not too high; often they have already decided to permanently reside in the western regions^[27].

The humanitarian impact of the migration crisis is profound. Displaced persons often face limited access to basic needs such as shelter, food, health care and education. For example, 22% of displaced persons surveyed by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) responded that their housing conditions were not adapted to the winter period in Ukraine. More than a third of respondents are unable to rent or buy an acceptable home due to financial constraints. About 2 million people who have found temporary shelter in rural communities are deprived of the opportunity to receive proper medical care. In addition, 44% of the surveyed IDPs of working age are deprived of a source of income. A small proportion of respondents, specifically one-third, named salaries as the main source of their income after being forced to change their place of residence, while a quarter of respondents reported that they rely on state aid to survive. As a result, the majority of IDP families had to take drastic measures in order to save, including cutting back on their expenses (70%), including food, and one third of them had to borrow money. Approximately 60% of IDPs – both those who have returned to their homes, and those who have stayed, need cash assistance. At the same time, the greatest need for medicines, construction materials, and repair work is mainly among those who have returned to their homes and those who have not left their homes (about 7% in both groups). The strain on host communities and the existing social fabric may lead to tensions and increased competition for resources. The psychological impact on people, including trauma and stress associated with displacement, is another important aspect that requires attention and support^[28].

It should be emphasized that the most painful problem among IDPs is the problem of acquiring temporary and own housing in the unoccupied territories. According to statistics, in the first years of Russian aggression, only 10% of internally displaced persons (about 160 thousand people) found their own housing, primarily in large cities. They hardly ever asked for help, positioning themselves as citizens who had moved from another region. A significant number of IDPs spend the lion’s share of their income on rent or live in unsuitable or emergency accommodation^[29].

The problem of IDPs in Ukraine should be addressed comprehensively, but today the state, facing a significant shortage of funds, is cutting back on support programs for this category of citizens, providing it only for the most socially vulnerable individuals and families.  

3. MIGRATION OF UKRAINIAN CITIZENS OUTSIDE THE STATE DETERMINED BY THE RUSSIAN-UKRAINIAN WAR

Russia’s large-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 triggered a powerful wave of migration beyond the country’s borders. The degree of readiness of Ukrainian citizens to move abroad varied: relatively speaking, a smaller part prepared in advance with resources and organizational capabilities, while the majority reacted to the situation, hoping until the last moment that there would be no war.

Nevertheless, as of February 2024, according to UNHCR estimates, the total number of registered Ukrainian military migrants with different protection statuses abroad amounted to 6.48 million. Of these, 6.004 million are in Europe, including 1.25 million in Russia and Belarus – voluntarily or deported, with 40,000 in Belarus. Outside Europe, mainly in the United States and Canada, there are 475.6 thousand people. This estimate includes Ukrainians who applied for asylum as refugees, persons with temporary protection, or other similar statuses. These figures should be treated with caution, especially in terms of further calculations. First, data on migrants in Russia and Belarus cannot be verified. Second, there is double counting. Many migrants from the eastern occupied regions had to cross the Russian border because they had no other way to escape. But some of them later ended up in western countries or in the government-controlled territory of Ukraine. Some citizens have been able to obtain temporary protection or register as migrants in several countries, including countries outside Europe. In addition, UNHCR’s estimates do not adequately account for returns to Ukraine or movements within Europe due to local procedures or lack of data. The Center for Economic Strategy tried to estimate more accurately the number of Ukrainian migrants abroad based on data from the border services and concluded that the number of Ukrainian refugees reached 4.9 million at the beginning of 2024. Also, according to Eurostat, at the end of January 2024, about 4.3 million people had temporary protection status in the EU. This is 24%-28% lower than the corresponding UN estimate. This difference should be taken into account when making forecasts of the number of migrants who will potentially return. Additionally, the data of the State Border Guard Service, which coincides with the data of the border services of European countries, gives much lower figures. In particular, as of September 2023, 22.9 million departures from Ukraine and 20.1 million entries were recorded since the beginning of the full-scale invasion. The difference amounted to 2.81 million people, while the UNHCR estimate of the number of Ukrainian military migrants cited above is more than three times higher. Even if we assume that border services did not record all migrants in the first weeks, this is not enough to explain the difference in estimates. This suggests that a significant number of Ukrainians who left before February 2024 for other, mostly economic reasons were granted temporary asylum or similar status. The chances of these citizens returning are low^[30].

The migration wave from Ukraine was so overwhelming that for the first time in its history, the European Union activated the Temporary Protection Directive, which sets out legal rules to help manage the massive influx of people. In parallel, the European Commission immediately began coordinating with EU countries to gather information on the situation on the ground and prevent human trafficking. The EU’s Migration and Crisis Preparedness Concept collects important information, such as refugee arrivals, to properly contribute to migration management. The recipient countries for Ukrainian refugees were countries that share borders with Ukraine (Moldova, Romania, Hungary, Poland), the Baltic States, and other European and American countries. Studies show that the maximum flow of migrants from Ukraine was directed to countries that have long-term migration relations with Ukraine^[31].

In particular, the Republic of Poland proved to be the most prepared – infrastructurally, financially, morally and psychologically – to receive a massive wave of immigrants from Ukraine. The main arguments in favor of choosing the Polish evacuation route were as follows:

− the language factor, i.e. the sufficient proximity of the Ukrainian and Polish languages, which allows those who arrived from Ukraine to find common ground in Poland as quickly and as well as possible;

− the proximity and accessibility of the Ukrainian-Polish state border, which is more than 500 km long and traditionally has several checkpoints along it, which in the force majeure situation were completely open to refugees from Ukraine;

− initial acquaintance with the Polish reality – many immigrants from Ukraine came to Poland before the war as labor migrants, tourists, or students of Polish universities. But the war made its own adjustments: earlier it was an economic/labor and educational wave, and now it is a chaotic and uncontrolled emigration, multi-level from the social, professional and educational points of view;

− Poland’s higher level of development as a member state of the European Union compared to Ukraine, where many emigrants see not only a better standard of living, but also new opportunities for self-realization. Today’s Ukrainian forced migrants are not cheap workers ready to do any job to make a quick buck, like most of their predecessors, but, as a rule, already established highly qualified specialists, businessmen, and knowledgeable individuals who are looking for similar or better working and self-realization conditions in Poland than they had in Ukraine;

− a simplified travel from Poland to third countries, primarily to developed countries of Western Europe, the United States, Canada, Australia, etc. Regular passenger trains for Ukrainian emigrants to Germany, the Czech Republic, the Netherlands, etc. have been organized from Poland^[32].

Over time, the conditions of Ukrainian migrants in Poland have deteriorated (financial support has decreased, the attitude of some Poles toward Ukrainians has changed for various reasons), which has led to an outflow of Ukrainians to other countries, including Germany and Ireland.

Thus, as of September 2023, Germany was the first country to host Ukrainian migrants, overtaking Poland. According to various sources, there are about 1.1 million Ukrainians in Germany and 990,000 in Poland. This is followed by the Czech Republic (340,000), Spain (178,000), Italy (158,000) and Bulgaria (157,000). Outside Europe, the United States and Canada have received the most Ukrainians: about 280,000 in the United States, and about 234,500 in Canada. Since August 2022, the number of registered Ukrainian refugees in Poland has decreased by more than 350,000, while in Germany it has increased by more than 410,000. Friends and acquaintances in Germany, high earnings and social benefits are the main reasons why Ukrainian refugees leave Poland for Germany. This coincides with the previous trend of economic migration of Ukrainian citizens, where friends’ recommendations were the main factor in choosing a country of residence for economic purposes. Material issues also played an important role, namely more attractive social benefits in Germany, the possibility of accumulating savings, and job offers with higher salaries^[33].

It should be noted that Russia’s propaganda and espionage network are doing everything they can to ensure that Ukrainians are viewed negatively in the countries where they reside in large numbers. For this purpose, various narratives are used, including the narrative that assistance to Ukrainians is a significant burden on the budget of the recipient country. At the same time, according to Polish sources, Ukrainian refugees in Poland have paid taxes worth 2 billion euros since the beginning of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine by Russian armed forces. This is three times more than the country has spent on assistance to IDPs^[34].

The migration processes that have taken place in Ukraine as a result of the Russian aggression have a significant socio-economic impact in various dimensions. Experts argue that the consequences of this migration crisis are drastic not only for the European community, but primarily for the Ukrainian economy. The destructive consequences are already felt today, but will be even more significant in the future. The enemy, in addition to seizing territories, has set the destruction of the Ukrainian nation, its language, culture, and history as its primary goal. Terrorism and genocide of the Ukrainian people by the aggressor, mass murders, torture, rape, and deportations to Russia have led to millions of people in Ukraine fleeing their homes because of the war. The enemy uses additional methods of influence on children and youth – forced education and upbringing using Russian programs and textbooks^[35].

Due to the significant decline in the population as a result of the war, the Ukrainian authorities have already faced and will face with renewed vigor the problem of returning Ukrainians from abroad and restoring the country’s demographic potential.

As Y. Belinska and O. Shevchuk argue, a number of measures should be taken to ensure the maximum possible return of Ukrainians after the war. First, it is important to cooperate with EU countries to return Ukrainians. Ukraine must convince its European partners that the return of refugees is a form of assistance to the country. An increased number of returnees will contribute to economic growth and security in Europe, reducing the EU’s costs of rebuilding Ukraine. Second, it is necessary to quickly restore the affected regions after the war. Those who left the destroyed cities for abroad may not be able to return due to the lack of infrastructure. Fast and transparent reconstruction will help Ukrainians return to their homeland.  Third, assistance should be provided to refugees from the affected regions during the reconstruction process. The survey shows that Ukrainians are ready to return if they receive support in the form of money or housing subsidies in safe areas. Fourth, it is important to help them find jobs in safe regions and organize retraining courses. The possibility of finding a high-paying job in Ukraine is an important motive for returning^[36].

Ukrainian experts predict that our country’s population will continue to decline. However, after the war is over, a large number of citizens from developing countries are likely to come to Ukraine. Attracting migrants from other countries will require not only financial and economic reforms, but also a tolerant attitude of our citizens, which should be borrowed from the residents of European countries. So far, the threats and risks associated with a large influx of labor migrants from developing countries are considered only hypothetical, as it is not known how long the war will last, what the mechanisms of economic recovery and the amount of investment in our country will be. However, there is no doubt that after the war ends, there will be an increased demand for labor in Ukraine, which can be met by attracting labor migrants from developing countries. Therefore, it is necessary to foresee potential threats and problems that need to be taken into account when formulating state policy on the adaptation and integration of labor migrants into society in the future^[37].

In our view, the Ukrainian government should make every effort to encourage the return of compatriots from abroad by creating a system of socioeconomic motivation, especially for young people and people of working age. Opinion polls of Ukrainians in different countries show that the majority would like to return home, but under certain conditions. If the Russian-Ukrainian war continues and the prospects for those who return are uncertain, there will be fewer and fewer people willing to return to Ukraine.  

Sociological surveys conducted in different countries show that many Ukrainian refugees are ready to return to Ukraine after the war ends or when they feel safe in Ukraine. The relevant data from different countries vary considerably, but they are united by one pattern – their numbers are steadily decreasing over time. As an example, the data from three waves of the 2022-2023 IAB-BiB/FReDA-BAMF-SOEP representative sociological survey among Ukrainian refugees in Germany show that the share of refugees who want to stay in Germany for a long time, i.e. for several more years or permanently, is increasing: at the end of summer 2022 it was 39 percent, in early 2023 – 44 percent, and in summer 2023 – 52 percent^[38]. The results of this survey also show that men, people under the age of 66, and those with a partner in Germany are more likely to stay in Germany than women, the elderly, and those with a partner in Ukraine^[39]. In addition, the following factors should be taken into account when refugees return home after the end of the conflict: security; availability of housing to return to; the possibility of earning a living; comparison of general living conditions at home and in the country of residence^[40].

Using various sociological data, demographers, sociologists, and economists rightly argue that the longer the war lasts, the more Ukrainians adapt to living abroad and, accordingly, the fewer will return home. They get used to the existing way of life in the host countries, their children attend kindergartens and schools there, and they themselves gradually integrate into local labor markets. The latter is confirmed, in particular, by the IAB-BiB/FReDA-BAMF-SOEP data for Germany, where the share of employed Ukrainians is much lower than in most Western and Eastern European countries. According to this survey, the share of employed Ukrainians increased from 16 to 23 percent over the year^[41]. As of the beginning of 2024, German experts are already operating at 27 percent, and some countries –  the United Kingdom, Denmark, the Netherlands, Estonia, Latvia, Poland – report the employment of 38 to 56 percent of Ukrainian refugees^[42].

Therefore, Ukrainian refugees are gradually adapting to new conditions and integrating into the social system of their host countries. At the same time, for a significant number of Ukrainian migrants, the language problem, the possibility of finding a job in a specialty according to their qualifications, and finding their place in foreign social relations remains a serious problem.

Conclusions

The Russian-Ukrainian war has become the greatest tragedy on the European continent since World War II. It has caused a number of negative processes, one of which is the forced migration of Ukrainians both within and outside the country. Forced migration from Ukraine has led to a significant decrease in the country’s socio-economic and demographic potential, the consequences of which are already evident and will become especially noticeable after the war ends.

Overcoming the negative trends of migration shifts determined by the Russian-Ukrainian war requires a comprehensive, scientifically based strategy on behalf of the state, which will differ significantly if the war continues, and after it ends.

The basic prerequisites for reducing the negative effects of migration processes in Ukraine are: the establishment of peace in the country; increasing employment; raising the level of citizens’ well-being; providing benefits for entrepreneurs, facilitating business development; creating conditions for foreign investment; improving social security; and a true fight against corruption. Successful steps in the return of refugees include an effective reintegration policy based on international experience with an emphasis on favorable social policy, including the provision of temporary or permanent housing for emigrants who have lost it, as well as opportunities for comprehensive self-realization for Ukrainian families returning from abroad.

Ukrainians abroad should see that they are needed by their own state which, through a system of legal and economic incentives and the implementation of human-centered programs, creates all possible conditions for the normalization of life in Ukraine.

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